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Medico-Moral Notes 
Gerald Kelly. S.J. 
)\ FEW YEARS AGO (October, 1947) this magazin e 
.l"l. published an article entitled "Common Grounds for Psychia-
trists and Priests," by Father Raphael C. McCarthy, S.J. 
The article indicated the mutual understanding and co-operation 
that should characterize the attitudes of priests and psychiatrists 
and their dealings with one another. I commend the reading, or 
rer eading, of that article to all priests, psychiatrists, and other 
medical men. I have chosen this same theme as the basis for the 
first part of these notes. 
Psychiatry in General 
It is scarcely two years since Msgr . Fulton J . Sheen's best-
seller criticism of psychiatry, Peace at Soul, was published. Some 
time later, another of psychiatry's critics, Father Felix D. Duffey, 
C.S.C., published Psychi[ttTY [md Asceticism. Dr. Francis J. Brace-
land, of the Mayo Clinic, a capable and sincere psychiatrist, 
reviewed both these books: the former in AmeTic{t, May 7,1949; 
the latter in Books on TTial, March, 1950. It should be profitable 
to r ecall some of Doctor Braceland's remarks. 
A common denominator of both these books is that the authors 
profess to condemn only a small group of materialistic psychia-
trists; and a common effect of both is that the total development 
of the books greatly blurs this important distinction so that the 
good name of psychiatry itself is jeopardized in the mind of the 
reader. As Doctor Braceland said when commenting on objections 
raised by Monsignor Sheen against some psychiatrists: 
"Psychiatrists and most analysts would agree with the :iVIonsi-
gnor in these objections, but it is an unfortunate fact that most of 
the listening and reading audience fails to discriminate so nicely 
and consequently the psychiatrist has li ttle peace of soul when he 
is being belabored with a stick. The blows fall upon the just and 
the unjust, even though the group which is the object of the attack 
is a limited one." 
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One of the charges leveled at psychi atrists is that they try 
to relieve their patient s of a sense of guilt that they should 
feel, and that t he patient would do much better to go to confession. 
Ther e is a sense of guilt which accompanies and follows upon 
guilty actions, and the proper place to take this is to God's own 
tribunal. But there is also a sense of guilt which has no foundation 
in actual sin, and thi s condition indicates mental pathology. 
Psychiatrists who attempt to treat t hi s pathological condition are 
within their p rovince. According to D octor Braceland, the general 
aim of modern psychiatry is to r elieve patients only of this patho-
logical guilt feeling, and not to blunt 01' do away with their sense 
of guilt over things of which they wer e r eally guilty. 
It has been said more than once r ecently that t he supreme 
defect of modern psychiatr y is its ignorance of original sin . I 
confess that, in r eading some of t hese statements, I have often 
wonder ed whether the authors had correct concepts of original sin. 
At times there seems to be an implica tion that original sin injured 
our hum a nit y in such a way that it left us so mewh a t less 
than hum an. 
All who deal with the human personality would benefit by a 
proper understanding of t he effects of original sin. I consider this 
a very important matter; and for this reason I have asked the 
Editor to r eprint in this issue an article entitled "Original Sin and 
Education," by R ev. Cyril Vollert, S.J. This article first appeared 
in R eviezlJ fO l· R eligious (July, 19M)) . It was written primarily for 
religious educators, but ever ything in it should be of interes t to 
Catholic physicians and of special profit to psychiatrist s. 
It seems to me that the car eful r eading of F ather Vollert's 
article should lead to these conclusions. 1. Since original sin took 
away only our .supernatural endowment and left our human nature 
intact, it is not necessary, generally speaking, for a psychiatrist 
to know about original sin in order to diagnose a mental illness. 
2. On the other hand, since the psychiatrist aims at the integration 
of the human personality, it would benefi t him immeasurably to 
know the r evealed doctrines pertinent to the F all of man and to hi s 
restoration in Christ. The psychiatrist who knows and accepts 
these doctrines will r ealize that, though his therapeutic helps are 
( 
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valuable for emotional integration, they do not suffice in themselves 
for the adequate rebuilding of the human personality. 
Though defendillg psychiatry against certain accusations and 
implications, Doctor Braceland is ready to admit its limitations. 
In the concluding paragraph of his review of Psychiatry and 
A sceticism he says: 
"All the shortcomings of psychiatry are hereby admitted. We 
who labor daily in its practice know them much better than do our 
critics, but it is submitted that what we need is help and clarifica-
tion, not vilification. The problem is before us and anyone who 
has the answer to the practical treatment of the neuroses is 
welcome. We can guarantee a respectful and courteous hearing 
to anyone who can give us assistance with real people, religious. 
irreligious and indifferent, who suffer with distressing emotional 
illnesses and who need help." 
Psychoanalysis 
It must be admitted that most criticisms of psychiatry by 
Catholics are really in tended for psychoanalysis. There are some 
Catholic scholars who are firmly convinced that we can have no 
part with psychoanalysis, Freud, or Freud's disciples. In the 
interests of constructive good feeling, as well as of sound scholar-
ship, I think I should point out that this is not the only view, nor 
even the majority view, of Catholic scholars . As Rev. Joseph 
Donceel, S.J., wrote in Thought (Sept., 1949, p. 466): "Although 
not a few thinkers are still rather wary about psychoanalysis, the 
majority are now ready to admit that Freud's system contains, 
along with certain errors, some deep and valuable insights about 
human nature, which it would be unwise to neglect." . 
Father Donceel's article ("Second Thoughts on Freud") is 
well worth the reading. It is a careful, objective appraisal of 
psychoanalysis. At the very beginning he summarizes the case 
against Freud with a terse clarity: "Philosophers have rejected 
his materialism; scientists have repudiated his unwarranted gener-
alizations; the normal civilized man has condemned his over-
emphasis on sex, his pansexualism." 
Thus go the general objections to Freud and Freudianism. In 
answer to the first objection it is sometimes asserted that far from 
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being a materialist Freud r eacted against t he crass materi alism of 
his age. It is true that he did react against the purely chemical 
or physical explanations of human activity, but in place of these 
he substituted sensism and psychic determinism, which allowed no ( , 
place for the spiritual soul and free will. 
F ather Donceel's criticism points out many of Freud's unwar-
ranted generalizations. For instance, from some true cases of the 
Oedipus complex-, Freudians argue to the conclusion that all pass 
through the stage of hating the parent of the same sex and being 
erotically attached to the other parent; because in some cases 
training in cleanliness profoundly affects the emotions of later 
life, therefore this is always the case; from the fact that some 
neuroses are of sexual origin it is argued that all neuroses are of 
sexual origin. Similarly, there is much overemphasis on the influ-
ence of the unconscious in conscious decisions, on the part played 
by r epression, on the universal dominance of the Super-Ego. 
Among the unwarran t ed generalizations, sex life deserves a 
special place. And the special victim is the infant, whose every 
appetitive activity has a sexual explanation. In this connection I 
cannot refrain from quoting this gem from Father Donceel's 
article: "Seen by a strict Freudian the nursery has become a den 
of abominations, and those big candid eyes, through which previous 
generations used to catch glimpses of heaven, reveal to Freud 
scenes worse than any in D ante's Infel·no ." 
Is there, then, any good in psychoanalysis? Father Donceel is 
just as careful to point out the good as he is to lay bare the evil. 
H e believes that the theory of psychic determinism can help to 
explain much of our act ivity that does not depend on free will: 
e.g., slips of speech, dreams, and so forth. H e agrees that the 
emotional influences of infancy and childhood no doubt profoundly 
affect later life, but he insists that they do not exercise a deter-
mining influence. H e thinks that the method of free association has 
value, and that much of what Freud said about the unconscious, 
the Super-Ego, repression, and so forth, is true; but by no means 
all of it. In a word, he is in agreement with the judgment of 
Roland Dalbiez (Psychoa.nalytic Method and the Doctl·ine of 
Fl·eud, II, 327) that Freud made a profound analysis "of the less 
human elements of human nature". The quot.cd words deserve 
) 
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emphasis. They show Freud's limitation . Denying the spiritual 
side of man's nature, he could see only the animal; and, though he 
could and did discover profound fact s about the animal in us, he 
was un able adequately to interpret these facts because of his 
blindness to the spiritual. 
F ather Donceel's schola rly conclusion on psychoanalysis runs 
as follows: 
"The system as a whole, in its p ure Freudian form, must be 
reject ed . But as it is nowadays presented by some of Freud's 
successors or disciples it gradually becomes more acceptable. 
Lifted out of their materiali stic context , pruned of their exaggera-
tions, quite a number of the Freudian discoveries can be r einter-
pl·cted in a sense which fits them nea tly into a Christian conception 
of man , not only as confirmations of what was known before, but 
a lso as new and deeper insights into some aspects of human 
nature. " 
I have cited Father Donceel at some length, partly because his 
article is fairly r ecent, partly because I consider it a splendid 
expression of what I might call an 0 b j ect i ve , unprejudiced 
appraisal of psychoanalysis. It sees neither all good, nor all bad , 
but both good and bad. This squares with ma ny scholarly studies 
I have r ead on the same subj ect. A Spanish Catholic authority on 
Frcud concluded a lengthy critical study with t he statement: "The 
truth is that he has egregious merits and egregious demerits". A 
sympathetic criticism by a F i'ench Catholic estimated t hat Freud's 
philosophy of life must be rej ected as materialistic, that his depth 
psychology contains some acceptable elements, and that his thera-
peutic technique is morally unobj ectionabl e and scientifically 
valuable. 
Another a rticle on Freud, substantially simila r to Father 
Donced's, is "Freud's Genius and Catholi c Thought," by R ev. 
Bakewell Morrison, S .J. , in Th e Queen's 'W od : for November , 
1948. Although Father Morri son's a rticle was published in a 
popular magazine for Catholic youth, it is none the less a profound 
study of Freud and worthy of careful consideration. He pointed 
out the good and the bad in the Freudian system; and he concluded 
with t hese constructive words: 
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"Freud did an immense, an unmeasurable benefit to mankind 
in making his genial discoveries. It is our business to use these 
findings , in every it em of truth that they contain, to the better 
service of God and to His glory. Likewise, it is also our business 
to realize that Freud is not the only one who has made discoveries 
that have helped physician and educator to a better insight and 
to a deeper understanding of the woes, esp ecially the mental 
ones, of men." 
The Catholic Attitude 
I have previously cited Doctor Braceland's words to the effect 
that psychiatrists ar e willing to accept unprejudiced criticism. I 
must be fr ank and say that I sometimes wonder whether this is 
very generally true of men who are analytically trained. "NIany 
analysists, even t.hose with a Catholic background, seem to be 
perpetually on the defensive. They r esent criticism of analytical 
theories as a manifestation of "resistance" ; they hesitate to 
examine and discuss criticism on its objective merits. This is, of 
course, an unscientific a ttitude, a poor preparation for the acquisi-
t ion of any science. 
·When I think of psychoanalysis, I am reminded of another 
attitude that should characterize the Catholic student. I call this 
the CathoUc attitude. I can illustrate what I mean by pointing to 
one of t he problems generated by the study of uncon scious 
motivation. 
The dynamic psychiatrist is so often confronted with what he 
considers the influence of un conscious motivation that he is apt to 
question the existence of real moral r esponsibility . For the unbe-
lieving materi alist t hi s p r esents no problem. H e simply denies free 
will and explains ever ything according to det erminist ic theories. 
The Catholic will not be trapped by such a crude conclusion; but 
he is apt to be deceived by a more subtle temptation which might 
be described in these words : "Of course, I believe we have free will. 
But it seems that we can never recognize in any individual act 
whether we are r eally act ing freely, or a t least with any notable 
degr ee of freedom." 
It should be noted that this is just what I have called it, a 
temptation. For it leads to the denial, a t least in practice, of 
( 
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important truths of our faith. For instance, the doctrine of the 
necessity of confession, as it is taught and practiced by the 
Church, presupposes that many of us commit mortal sins and 
that we can be conscious of these sins. And the doctrine on the 
canonization of saints presupposes that a t least those worthy of 
canonization practice conscious and deliberate acts of virtue 
frequently and to a heroic degree. And the asceticism of the 
Church, from the time of Christ, presupposes that the general run 
of the faithful can either practice a virtuous self-discipline or fall 
into sin, not just occasionally, but from day to day. These 
doctrines must be true. Any psychological theory which runs 
counter to them must be false. 
As regards the study of psychoanalysis, the Catholic with the 
proper attitude approaches the various facts and theories with 
this conviction: "I cannot accept any theory or any intcrpretation 
of data which conflicts with Catholic doctrine. It may be hard to 
formulate the correct theory or to discover the correct interpreta-
tion; but anything which contradicts truths of faith must be 
wrong." And may I add that the necessity of having this conviction 
is not limited to those who study psychoanalysis? Every Catholic 
scholar needs it. 
In my years of association with physicians, it has been my 
good fortun e to deal mostly with Catholic physicians who possessed 
thc Catholic attitude. But there have been a few disagreeable 
cxceptions. I am particularly and painfully reminded of one 
occasion when I addressed a gl'oup of physicians among whom were 
several young Catholics who wer e skeptical almost to the point of 
hostility. For instance, these young men had evidently devoured 
the charges made by Mr. Blanchard against the Church but it had 
never occurred to them to read Doctor :McGoldrick's forceful 
reply to this biassed attack. At some point in their training they 
had developed the habit of picking flaws in the Church's teaching. 
This is certainly not a true Catholic attitude; and it is very 
unpleasant for a priest to be faced with it, espec ially III a 
public discussion . 
Emotions and Morals 
The mysterious phenomena uncovered by the new psychologies 
arc not ,the only things that pose problems concerning the indi-
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vidual's moral r esponsibility . Even the normal emotions consciously 
experienced by normal people in everyday life create a problem. 
Catholic moralists have always been interest ed in this problem of 
the influence of emotions on deliberate action. But much of what G 
they have written is buried in L a tin tomes or only briefly synop-
sized in English manuals of ethics or moral theology . 
. R ecently a more comprehensive treatment of the Scholastic 
teaching on the influence of emotions on moral responsibility has 
appeared in English. I r efcr to Emotions and Morals, by R ev. 
Patrick O'Brien, C.M. (New York, Grune and Stratton, 1950.) 
Father O'Brien gives first a general exposition of Scholastic 
teaching on the emotions, then specific chapters concerning such 
things as anger, fear, sex desire, and so forth. He is interested 
primarily in the normal individual and in t he emotional r eactions 
normall y exp erienced. I r ecommend this book to all physicians, 
and I think that psychiatrists should consider it a professional 
duty to become acquainted with its contents. 
Keeping Patients Alive 
Since I last published notes in this p eriodical the publicity 
given the Sander's case caused a great stir over euthanasia . Many 
Catholic journals printed excellent a rticles on the subject; and it 
was comforting to note the strong r eaction against euthanasia in 
medical circles throughout the land. 
But it is one thing to kill a patient; it is another to let him 
die. That there is, or a t least can be, a difference between these 
things may be simply illustrat ed by an example that has nothing 
to do with medicine. Suppose, for instance, that a friend of 
mine is floundering in the water and about to drown. I certainly 
do not kill him by simply letting him drown . However, I might 
have an obligation to save him; and the conscious failure to fulfill 
this obligation would be sinful. This obligation would be present 
if I had a reasonable hope of saving my friend without bringing 
serious ha rm to myself. But it would obviously not exist if I had 
no hope of saving him (e.g. because I am a poor swimmer) or if I 
could save him only by seriously harming myself (e.g. if I have a 
weak heart ) . 
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This distinction between killing and letting die is applicable to 
the field of medicine. A physician may never kill a patient. And 
there is a certain minimum of car e that must be given to every 
patient. But beyond this minimum, the obligation depends on the 
circumstances of each case. It is easy to state these general rules, 
but very difficult to make them more specific, especially as regards 
the use of artificial means of saving or sustaining life. Some have 
tried to simplify the matter for the medical profession by saying 
that the physician's obligation is coextensive with that of his 
patient: in other words, the physician is obliged to do for his 
patient what the patient would be obliged to do for himself. This 
is oversimplifi cation. Generally speaking, the physician's duty to 
his patient includes not only what the patient would be obliged to 
do, but also what the patient reasonably wishes, or would wish, to 
be done. :Moreover, the physician has a duty to his profession, as 
well as to hi s patient. In determining the use of such things as 
oxygen, blood transfusions, intravenous feeding, and so forth, the 
physician must have regard for the reasonable ideals of his profes-
sion, and he must avoid any policy which would create a danger 
of euthanasia. 
Perhaps what I have just said is too vague. I have developed 
this same theme in an article entitled "The Duty of Using Artificial 
Means of Preserving Life," in the June, 1950, number · of Theo-
iog'ical Stud'ies. The article is too long a nd too complicated to be 
digested here. Moreover, it was written mainly to stimulate discus-
sion. I should appreciate it if physicians interested in this 
problem would read the article and would send me the fruit of their 
r efl ections and discussions. 
About the same time as my article appeared the newspapers 
were making much of a suggestion made by a Belgian scientist, 
Dr. Jacques Roskam, to the effect that physicians should let aged 
incurables di e under certain circumstances. A definite case cited 
by Doctor Roskam concerned a woman of 70, incurably ill , who 
had been kept alive in a coma for about a year and a half. H e 
recommended that, in a case like this, intravenous feeding be 
withdrawn and the patient be permitted to die. 
{, I would agree with Doctor Roskam that in a case like this the 
withdrawal of intravenous feeding cannot reasonably be likened to 
euthanasia . And, as I said in my article in Theological Studies , I 
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think that, generally speaking, the duty of using artificial means 
of sustaining life in a terminal coma is very dubious. Nevertheless, 
the reasonable determination of the borderline between what must 
and what need not be done cannot be the product of mere abstract 
thinking; it must be made according to the prudent judgment of 
conscientious men. I encourage physicians to give some thought to 
this problem and to discuss it with moralists. 
Hormones and the Sex Impulse 
Some months ago I received a communication from a doctor 
asking me to discuss in this column the morality of using certaiJl 
hormone treatments that stimulate the sex impulse. U nfortunately, 
as I write the present notes, I do not have at hand all thc details 
of the physician's letter. 
Nevertheless, I think I can state very briefly the principle that 
should be followed when various hormone treatments are used. It 
is the same principle that is clearly stated on page 7 of Ethical 
(Ind R eligious DiTectives faT Catholic Hospitals : "Any procedure 
harmful to the patient is morally justified only in so far as it is 
designed to produce a proportionate good". 
Certainly it is morally justifiable to use hormone treatment 
with the reasonable hope of effecting great physical good even 
though the evil r esult of the treatment might be a temporarily 
heightened sex .impulse. It is true that this may involve strong 
temptations against chastity for the patient, but since these are 
unintentional they may be justified according to the principle of 
the double effect. On the other hand, apart from very special 
circumstances, I see no moral justification for the use of hormon e 
treatments when the good to be obtained is highly problematical 
and the resultant sex stimulation may induce mental torture and 
the occasion of frequent sins. I have seen cases in which the use of 
hormones for menopausal troubles brought about such persistent 
sexual disturbances that one might well doubt the value of the 
treatments even on a purely medical basis. 
I r ealize that this problem has many facets, and that in some 
instances the hormon e treatments bring about sexual calm rather 
than excitement. For this reason I have simply given the principle 
and some rather obvious examples. Communications referring to 
more specific problems will be welcomed. 
I 
